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Abstract: Theorists of post capitalism have recently argued for a more or less inevitable end 
to capitalism. They assume that private accumulation is systematically blocked by the inabil-
ity of capitalist corporations to create revenues by setting prices as they lose control over the 
reproduction of their commodities and that in this process, capitalist labour will eventually 
disappear. Drawing on a case study of Amazon and thoughts on the policies of other leading 
digital corporations, we challenge these assumptions. Key corporate players of digitization 
are trying to become powerful monopolies and have partly succeeded in doing so, using the 
network effects and scaling opportunities of digital goods and building socio-technical eco-
systems. These strategies have led to the development of in part isomorphic structures, 
hence creating a situation of oligopolistic market competition. We draw on basic assumptions 
of monopoly capital theory to argue that in this situation labour process rationalization be-
comes key to the corporation’s competitive strategies. We see the expansion of digital con-
trol and the organizational structures applied by key corporate players of the digital economy 
as evidence for the expansion of capitalist labour, not its reduction. 
Keywords: Digitalization, capitalism, digital labour, digital economy, Amazon, Google, mar-
ket, control, organization 
1. Introduction 
Analysis of the current state and predictions about the future development of capital-
ism frequently tend to exaggerate the role of individual elements of economic sys-
tems. They often start by considering the sectors that determine structure, because, 
in economic terms, they account for the largest portion of employment and contribute 
most to creating added value. But these two factors tell us little about the material 
nature of work, about labour processes, about the use of the labour force, about 
opening new markets, or about control at the workplace. In short, they contribute little 
to answering questions raised by sociological theories of capitalism. Such theories 
analyse capitalism on the basis of conditions of production, the use of labour, specific 
forms of market inclusion, and organization politics, rather than focusing only on the 
structures of employment and creating added value. 
Considering the analysis of contemporary capitalism, digitization has emerged as 
a meta-trend, which diverges from the familiar borders that separate economic sec-
tors or branches (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2016). Currently, there are increasing in-
dications that we are in the midst of new wave of technological innovation fuelled es-
pecially by three factors: (1) revolutions in data storage, processing, and retrieval (big 
data); (2) the growing dissemination and interconnectedness of digital devices 
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among producers and consumers; and (3) the development of intelligent algorithms. 
Digitization has the potential to affect all areas of production and all segments of the 
labour market and can thus serve as a basis for reasonable analysis of transfor-
mations in contemporary capitalism. Digitization is transforming work in numerous 
different ways, and changing business strategies, job profiles, organizational policies, 
chains of productions, and forms of employment as well as labour relations.  
However, in recent literature on the digitization of the economy, voices have 
emerged describing digitization as the gravedigger of capitalism. Rifkin (2015) and 
Mason (2016), to name just two of the most prominent authors, both argue for the 
inevitable end of capitalism in the light of digitization. Both authors argue that with the 
rise of the Internet of things, the logic of zero marginal costs, which characterizes 
digital goods (the reproduction of a product comes at almost no costs), will become 
ubiquitous in the economy. As things in the future economy come almost for free, 
Rifkin and Mason argue, it becomes very hard for companies to reap profits. At the 
same time the rise of the sharing economy and collaborative peer production are 
supposed to be a source of a new non-capitalist production model (Mason 2016, 
141ff). In this new “post capitalist” economy, in Mason’s (2016, 181) terms, “Info-tech 
makes the abolition of work possible”, meaning that labour is freed from the chains of 
rationalization and control. 
At the core of these theories is the assumption that private accumulation is sys-
tematically blocked by the inability of capitalist corporations to create revenues by 
setting prices as they lose control over the reproduction of their commodities in an 
economy where people have the power to make most things in non-capitalist produc-
tion models themselves. In this article we want to address the question if, from an 
empirical point of view, this is actually a proper description of current developments 
in “digital capitalism” (Schiller 1999). We ask two questions in particular: Is the digital 
economy really moving towards a state in which corporations lose all control over 
markets, which then become increasingly decommodified? And second, is there real-
ly any end to capitalist labour or at least a reduction in capitalist modes of exploitation 
connected to the trend towards digitization? 
When asking these questions, one has to acknowledge that there is a strong line 
of research in digital labour offering arguments against the thesis of an inevitable  
end of capitalism and the liberation of labour. Examples of authors engaged in this 
strand of research abound. To name but a few: Scholz (2012) describes numerous 
transformations of digital labour while Dyer-Witheford (2015) introduced the term 
cyber-proletariat to capture the logic of exploitation of digital labour. Following trans-
national chains of production from mineral extraction, assembling work of digital 
hardware to software production and services, Fuchs (2014) shows how digitization 
enhances profit extraction by enabling a more frictionless global division of labour. 
Fisher and Fuchs (2015) show the continuous strength of Marxian socioeconomic 
theory when applied to digital capitalism. 
However, in our view, to counter theories arguing for our path into post capitalism 
such as Rifkin and Mason in particular, one would have to show that in spite of the 
particular characteristics of digital commodities, companies dealing in such products 
on one hand manage to nevertheless gain market control and do so, on the other 
hand, on the basis of the exploitation of human labour. The aim of this article is thus 
to exemplify the connection of market and labour control empirically. Drawing on a 
case study of the company Amazon, we will show how key corporate players in the 
digitization process manage to form quasi-monopolies in order to gain market control. 
We argue that there is a high probability for digital giants of the present—in particular 
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Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Facebook—to develop increasingly conver-
gent product portfolios, thereby creating a situation of a market dominated by large 
oligopolies. Focussing on Amazon, we then show how such oligopolies in digital capi-
talism create profit mainly by enforcing rationalization and labour control. Our analy-
sis will lead us to the development of certain theoretical terms, which, in our view, 
could prove helpful in the analysis of digital capitalism when applying them to other 
cases. We will tentatively explore these terms in the context of theoretical assump-
tions of Fordist and post-fordist capitalism.  
In order to show the systematic connection between market- and labour control in 
digital capitalism, we use a basic assumption drawn from classical industrial sociolo-
gy theories of labour and monopoly capital (Sweezy and Baran 1966; Braverman 
1998). While one can draw many questions from monopoly capital theory when ap-
plying it to digital capitalism, in order to make our argument, we will focus exclusively 
on the relationship of monopolies, price setting and labour control. Classical monopo-
ly capital theory argued that monopolistic or oligopolistic companies managed to cre-
ate surplus by maintaining the capability of high-level price setting and cutting costs 
at the same time. In industrial sociology’s labour process debate, Braverman and 
others (Braverman 1998; Edwards 1979; Burawoy 1982) showed how the cost cut-
ting aspect of the production model was enforced especially by enhancement of la-
bour control, thus demonstrating the systematic relation between market- and labour 
control in the process of capitalist production. We argue that we can understand cur-
rent developments in digital capitalism when using such a perspective as, in light of 
oligopolistic tendencies, competition about labour efficiency becomes more and more 
essential to capitalist reproduction. In our view, this is evidence against theories of 
post capitalism claiming that capitalist labour is coming to an end. 
In the first section of this article, we will argue for a perspective, which focuses in 
particular on leading digital economy companies in order to assess broader changes 
in the economy. We will then confront contemporary theories of post capitalism with 
the strategies of leading digital economy companies to build socio-technical ecosys-
tems in order to stabilize their current quasi-monopolies. In the second section we 
will start exploring more deeply the mechanisms applied by Amazon in order to retain 
its monopolistic position in E-Commerce and elaborate our assumption that the digi-
tal monopolies of the present increasingly converge on their supply side, thus creat-
ing a new situation of market competition. Drawing on a key theorem of traditional 
monopoly capital theory, in the third section, we will then show how in this situation, 
rationalization and the enforcement of labour control become more and more essen-
tial to the creation of profits. Again, we will elaborate tentative theoretical concepts, 
considering a new mode of labour control and a new kind of workforce that could be 
useful in further comparative research. In the fourth and concluding section we sum-
marize our arguments made against theories of post-capitalism and argue that digital 
capitalism is maturing in the usage of digital technologies, since it is following tracks 
well known from the history of industrial societies, especially labour control. 
2. Key Corporate Players as Digital Monopolies 
In order to understand the relationship between market and labour control in contem-
porary digital capitalism, it is important to look at key corporate players in the digitiza-
tion process as such companies set the pace for the rest of the economy. Besides 
introducing new digital strategies into existing modes of production and distribution, 
key players of the digital economy, such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple or Fa-
cebook pursue a strategy of disruption. They literally bypass familiar forms of open-
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ing up markets, which usually concentrate on optimizing minor improvements of ex-
isting products; instead, their aim is to radically challenge the functional logic of es-
tablished markets. Disruptive technologies and business strategies draw more tradi-
tional branches of the economy into what has been called the “digital vortex” (Dyer-
Witheford 2015). Systematically generated ruptures affect the institutional order of 
labour markets, companies, and organizations as well as labour processes and the 
significance of labour as a commodity. In short, they lead to pressures for change in 
diverse areas of the world of work, triggering deinstitutionalization and transformation 
processes. This pressure of change results, in turn, in the emergence of new social 
orders, which, taken together, are promoting a new type of capitalist economy. 
The best-known and most influential of the key digital economy companies have 
their main offices in Silicon Valley or elsewhere on the American west coast. They 
provide the infrastructure for the World Wide Web, determine digital forms of com-
munication and user activities, and supply the software and hardware needed for dig-
ital networking. As the central (or, in the language of research on operational net-
works, “focal”) operator of strategic digital networks and the direct or indirect employ-
er of hundreds of thousands of people, these key players shape working conditions 
not only for the commercial Internet but also for many other sectors. In light of this, 
scholars such as Fuchs (2014) have called for a perspective that also takes the glob-
al peripheries of Internet and technology companies into account. According to this 
view, Foxconn workers who assemble Apple I-Phones are a systematic element of 
digital capitalism, as are those working in coltan mines in various regions of the 
world. 
The economic transactions of leading digital economy companies—Google, Apple, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft in particular—use two different currencies: money 
and information. Google or Facebook accounts are free at first, but users “pay” with 
personal information that is in effect the companies’ primary capital. These data gi-
ants improve their market position by accumulating user data that allows them to 
constantly optimize the algorithms structuring their companies’ service and produc-
tion processes. On the one hand, these permanent feedback loops between users 
and the digital production process heighten the value of user experiences, as cus-
tomers’ wishes and preferences can be employed to constantly improve services. On 
the other hand, technical processes that rely on user data are also the basis for tar-
geted advertising and big-data applications that are in fact the core business of com-
panies like Google or Facebook. 
Authors like Mason and Rifkin argue that since these companies deal to a signifi-
cant amount in digital commodities, it is hard for them to run long term profitable 
businesses. Digital commodities entail a logic of zero marginal costs (Rifkin 2015), 
which means that in a situation of market competition, prices have to fall close to the 
point where they match with production cost, which apparently are close to zero, fi-
nally making it impossible to generate profits. As digital hardware becomes gradually 
cheaper and robotization more broadly available, the logic of zero-marginal costs 
spreads from the digital economy to basically every industry. Furthermore, as means 
of production are being decentralized in the rise of 3D printing, the Internet of things 
or the maker movement, supported by the rise of peer production and sharing prac-
tices, the production of commodities increasingly happens outside of traditional cor-
porations, finally rendering them redundant. While Rifkin sees a historical inevitability 
in the rise of “collaborative commons” as a dominant form of commodities, Mason 
(2016, 118f) argues that companies could try to retain control over price setting by 
building monopolies. However, like Rifkin, Mason argues that these attempts will be 
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failing in the end as they cannot stop the rise of open source and peer production. In 
opposition to these assumptions, we argue that leading digital economy companies 
have been working quite successfully on building monopolies in certain areas in or-
der to control markets and obtain the power of price setting. They do so by creating 
social closure through socio-technical ecosystems in order to create strong customer 
retention. 
2.1. Building Closure in Socio-Technical Ecosystems 
In the visions of theorists of post capitalism, digitization continues to be frequently 
associated with hopes that it will decentralize economic life and contribute to democ-
ratizing it in the process. According to these expectations, in the digital capitalism of 
the future, production knowledge will be spread widely, with computer nerds and 
techie communities collaborating to devise innovations that are made freely available 
to all. Smart apps and customer-friendly services will contribute to shaping a world 
that offers consumers and producers more choice and more opportunities to get in-
volved. But a closer look at the centrepiece of digital capitalism, the Internet econo-
my, reveals the sobering logic of the digital market. Today, digital capitalism’s mar-
kets are a far cry from the models of the neoclassic economy based on complete 
competition between numerous suppliers of similar goods and services, none of 
which dominate the market, and transparency with respect to all relevant information. 
Instead, the key markets of digital capitalism reveal phenomena familiar to what has 
been called “monopoly capitalism” in 1960s and 70s debates within industrial sociol-
ogy (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Braverman 1998): concentration and control of mar-
kets and monopolization.  
In the digital economy of today, monopoly tendencies result from systematic Mat-
thew effects that have two main causes. Firstly, on the supply side, there are specific 
effects of scale; that is, the development costs of digital products are high, but the 
marginal costs of producing each unit (of software, for example) are then extremely 
low. Subjecting theories of post capitalism to empirical scrutiny, we find that this dy-
namic of (close to) zero marginal costs does not prevent the rise of powerful mo-
nopolies. On the contrary, as a result of zero marginal costs, companies can sell 
large quantities of products at relatively low prices or even distribute them free of 
charge, for example as a means of promoting long-term customer loyalty. Moreover, 
the larger a company is, the higher are its advantages in terms of costs and speed 
when developing new products and the more diverse is its product portfolio. In other 
words, large companies profit from systematic superiority over their smaller competi-
tors. Secondly, on the demand side, specific network effects (Romer 1990; Shapiro 
and Varian 1999, 173–226; Rochet and Tirole 2003) come into play which result from 
the fact that the benefits of many digital products increase as more people use them. 
Once a critical mass of users is “on board”, then it becomes attractive for more and 
more people to also enter the system. When the demand for a successfully estab-
lished product reaches a specific magnitude, demand becomes a self-reinforcing 
process. Network gains thus make strong competitors stronger and weak ones 
weaker. If network effects and effects of scale occur together, they promote process-
es of monopolization or oligopolization and the development of “winner-takes-it-all 
markets” (Frank and Cook 1995), in which smaller companies fall behind.  
Classic monopolization processes in industrial monopoly capitalism were often 
based on “natural monopolies” (Varian 1997, 397–399)—they are in fact in some 
ways similar to the monopolies of digital capitalism. With respect to their material pre-
requisites, natural monopolies are based on extremely high fix costs and variable 
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costs that are relatively low in comparison. Telecommunications, energy, and water 
utilities as well as rail services were dependent on comprehensive, cost-intense in-
frastructure networks, while the commodity or service itself was relatively inexpen-
sive. Competitors found it difficult to deal with the resulting effects of scale, once the 
necessary infrastructure was in place. Building new rail or telephone networks was 
seldom worthwhile for new providers. But this has changed in digital capitalism. Cur-
rently, Google more or less holds a monopoly as a search-engine provider. But the 
fact that this position was held until rather recently by Yahoo demonstrates that the 
monopolies of digital companies are—or at least were in the past—highly “volatile 
monopolies” (Dolata 2015). Until not so long ago, creative thinkers could capitalize 
on the low marginal costs of digital products without being dependent on one of the 
Internet giants. A good idea and some venture capital were enough to revolutionize a 
market and knock the frontrunner off its throne. Theorists of post capitalism like Rifkin 
and Mason have this situation in mind when arguing against the likelihood of monop-
olization in future digital capitalism. 
But a close look at the digital giants of today reveals the fact that digital companies 
have learned from this kind of experience in the early days of the Internet. As digital 
capitalism approaches adulthood, large corporations are aiming to create socio-
technical ecosystems integrating hardware and software that meet as many user 
needs as possible and make it harder for users to switch to another provider. Estab-
lishing such socio-technical ecosystems occurs in a number of steps. First, compa-
nies acquire their competitors in order to expand their own share of markets. They 
also enlarge their product portfolio, incorporating new know-how by buying compa-
nies that do not appear at first glance to belong to their core operations. Amazon, for 
example, acquired online retailers that sold a wide range of goods and successively 
made the transition from a digital bookseller to an all-round retailer, at the same time 
it invested in robotics, web-services, and hardware companies. Google is also one of 
the most active companies when it comes to mergers and acquisitions and invests in 
numerous companies whose connection to its core business of Internet searches and 
advertising only becomes apparent on closer inspection. It has for example bought 
Nest, a start-up that developed smart thermostats and smoke detectors, and become 
the world’s largest producer of robotic technology thanks to various acquisitions. This 
expansion of Google’s product range is, of course, by no means based on random 
decisions. The Nest deal aims to establish Google’s position in the emerging market 
for “connected homes” systems (a market also targeted by Apple and Amazon). And 
as outlined above, Amazon’s investments in robotics promote optimization of their 
storage and transportation logistics systems.  
A company’s own hardware devices play a key role in embedding users in closed 
socio-technical ecosystems. They offer customers a number of synchronized and 
interlinked programs and services. The anchor product—whether it’s an iPad, a Nex-
us, a Surface or a Kindle—serves as a digital hub for all forms of communication and 
coordination. Once a user is integrated into such a socio-technical space for commu-
nication—because, for example, she or he stores data and files it in a specific pro-
vider’s cloud—then other applications from the same provider dock into the existing 
structure. This results in closed systems that are as complex as they are highly per-
sonalized and systematically impede changing to another provider, since users would 
then generally face a loss of aggregated data, with unpleasant consequences. Thus, 
building socio-technical ecosystems, together with the network effects and scaling 
possibilities of digital goods, serves the stabilization of digital monopolies. In order to 
explore this dynamic in detail and link it to the logic of price setting and creation of 
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profits, we will now take a closer look at the company Amazon as a prime example 
for building a monopoly in the digital economy. 
3. Monopolies Amazon-Style 
By far the largest online retailer, Amazons’ worldwide sales recently surpassed those 
of its next competitors taken together (Dolata 2015). Well known for sacrificing profits 
in favour of business expansion for most of the company’s history, Amazon has re-
cently shown big profits thanks to the expansion of its lucrative cloud computing 
business. For the second quarter of 2016, the company reported $2.89 billion in rev-
enue from its Amazon Web Services business and $17.67 billion from its retail busi-
ness. However, operating income from Amazon Web Services in the same time peri-
od amounted to $718 million, up from $305 million for the same period in 2015, which 
was slightly more than the operating income generated by its North American retail 
business (Wingfield 2016). In the following section, we will discuss various decisive 
parameters of the rise of Amazon as monopoly, in order to exemplify mechanisms of 
how monopolies are being built in the digital economy. Following a thick description 
of Amazon’s business strategy (2.1), we provide a tentative theoretical generalization 
based on our analysis of Amazon, which can be helpful when studying other cases 
(2.2). We then return to Amazon (3) focusing primarily on the aspects of rationaliza-
tion and labour control in the company (3.1) and then again develop tentative gener-
alizations in order to frame concepts which could be applied to other cases. 
3.1. A Brief History of the Amazon Ecosystem 
What is Amazon: a retailer or a technology company? For a long time, Amazon CEO 
Jeff Bezos was laughed at by other pioneers of the Internet age for uncompromising-
ly asserting that the second answer to this question was correct (Stone 2013). Ama-
zon’s founder was adamant about his plan to build a digital services company, rather 
than just another retailer. Even in 1994, the year it was established, Amazon was far 
ahead of its time albeit forced to offer “analogous”, tangible goods—in the mid-1990s, 
the technical prerequisites for digitization of most of the products offered simply were 
not in place. Amazon’s original focus, Internet book sales, offers especially convinc-
ing evidence of this observation. The first digital reader entered the market in 1999 
(the Rocket eBook marketed by NuvoMedia), five years after Amazon came into ex-
istence (the Kindle went on sale for the first time in 2007). Since then, the company 
has demonstrated its characteristic drive to expand in this market segment. In 2014, 
Amazon’s Kindle accounted for over two thirds of US e-book sales. But e-readers 
and other mobile electronic devices make up only a fraction of the company’s huge 
technology network, which has developed internally with respect to its organizational 
structure, personnel management, and human relations strategies, as well as exter-
nally on a variety of markets, in pursuing the company’s strategy of integrating these 
markets comprehensively into its activities.  
Amazon’s policy targets the transformation of established markets and the genera-
tion of new ones by means of digitization. The book trade, Amazon’s “home base,” is 
a paradigmatic example of how it has pursued this policy. On the first level of trans-
forming the book market, Amazon entered the established market for printed books 
as a new competitor; in effect, it first simply reorganized the classic booksellers’ 
model by selling books on a new, digital market. This large-scale virtual market was 
successful especially because it offered the advantage of “one-stop shopping” for a 
huge selection of titles from one bookseller. Amazon successively expanded the 
range of available goods, to the point that today there is hardly a product in existence 
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that can’t be bought from Amazon. The bookseller has become a gigantic—and po-
tentially unlimited—digital department store. On the second level of this process, 
Amazon’s platform capitalism was introduced to realize a much more active trans-
formation of its markets, in which its Internet platform was used not only as a digital 
market place but also as a digital production system. Meanwhile, this system has 
been especially successful on the book market, swallowing up the business that was 
previously the domain of publishing companies— in effect, Amazon’s suppliers. It is 
part of Amazon’s policy to use its dominant position on the market to demand above-
average discounts or other concessions from publishers and to pull no punches in 
this kind of price battle. In fact, as Amazon has become a sales platform without 
which no publisher is able to survive, the company has become very successful in 
setting the prices on the side of its suppliers.  
But using the Amazon platform as a production system is part of a much more far-
reaching strategic goal. Ultimately, the aim is to render publishing houses, as inter-
mediaries between authors on the one side and sales and distribution (Amazon) on 
the other, completely superfluous and in effect throw them out of the game. Intelligent 
editing software and, of course, the Kindle as Amazon’s own consumer device are 
the digital means for ensuring the success of this planned revolution in publishing. 
Amazon in this case is pursuing a strategy for the book market that resembles what 
Apple has developed on the music market with the iPod and the iTunes Store. Steve 
Jobs beat out Jeff Bezos with respect to the lucrative digital music market. But Bezos 
adapted the Apple business model for his attack on the book market in linking the 
Kindl and the Amazon platform (Stone 2013). Amazon offers a self-publishing func-
tion with which authors can market their own e-books and pocket a larger share of 
revenue from sales than what they would earn by publishing their e-book with a nor-
mal publishing company. But these authors are also not integrated into the paternal-
istic system of a publishing house. Amazon dictates price policies for self-published 
e-books, purportedly in the interests of customers. New, more flexible, performance-
linked payments for authors in the self-publishing scheme were recently introduced. 
Payments are now based on the number of pages read, rather than the number of e-
book downloads.  
3.2. Markets: Digital Invention, Analogous Destruction, Convergence 
In shaping markets, Amazon follows a logic of digital creation, in which “analogous” 
market structures are disrupted. In our view, this seems to be a characteristic which 
applies to other digital monopolies as well and finally leads to oligopolistic rather than 
monopolistic market structures: The installation of socio-technical ecosystems has an 
important side effect. Although the core business of each Internet Corporation lies in 
a different sector (advertising, software, consumer entertainment electronics, retail 
sales), their supply structure is increasingly convergent. They constantly observe and 
adapt to one another, leading to in part “isomorphic” (DiMaggio and Powell 2000) 
structures on the supply side. Although companies like Google and Amazon are not 
competitors in their classic core fields of business, they now increasingly compete 
with one another.  
Such developments, on first sight, could support theories of post capitalism: Even 
though companies like Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft or Facebook are trying to 
build solid monopolies, the competition which arises from convergence of their supply 
structure could again put pressure on prices making it impossible for these compa-
nies to set prices for their products beyond their near-zero production costs. 
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There are, however, at least two strategies these companies use to counter such a 
situation. First, due to the growing similarities in the goods and services offered, 
competition for profits is played out mostly on the field of innovation. All key corporate 
players follow ambitious innovation strategies, be it by acquisitions of promising 
startups or by spending huge amounts of capital on research and innovation—
Googles’ “moonshot factory” is only the most prominent example for these attempts. 
The radical orientation towards innovation has impregnated the digital economy with 
an ideological narrative based on what seems to be a trivialization of Schumpeters’ 
economic theory: Schumpeter countered the idea shared by neoclassical and Marxist 
economic theorists alike, that prices are the weapon of choice in the war for markets, 
by asserting that the decisive variable in modern markets was the competition fuelled 
by “new goods, new technology” (Schumpeter 1983). In Silicon Valley ideology, con-
firmation for this dictum can be found in the core companies of digital capitalism, 
whose strategies for the future rely especially on disruptive innovations—sweeping 
technological advances with benefits that are capable of restructuring or even gener-
ating consumer needs and entire markets in the process (Christensen 1997). The 
analytical suggestion made by this narrative is that, after the manager and share-
holder models of recent decades, the entrepreneur is returning in digital capitalism as 
a key figure of company leadership (see, for example, Thiel and Masters 2014). Be-
cause of the increasing focus on innovations that may be unprofitable in the short run 
but revolutionary in the long term, the ideal type of the audacious, far-sighted entre-
preneur described by Schumpeter is supposed to be in demand again and in fact 
entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs, Marc Zuckerberg or Jeff Bezos are being glorified to-
day just like Bill Gates was in the 1990s. There is little evidence, however, that, with 
the renaissance of the entrepreneur, the model of patrimonial management is also 
returning, in which the people at the helm, like Fordist captains of industry, enter into 
long-term relationships of social obligations with their employees. Instead, companies 
like Amazon engage both in the tightening of repressive labour control and the exter-
nalization of formal employment into officially self-employed forms of work. 
This leads us to the second strategy large digital economy companies apply in or-
der to extract profit in situations of oligopolistic competition, namely the enforcement 
of rationalization and labour control. Whether we consider large corporations, inde-
pendent platforms, or platform companies like Amazon, the digitization of market-
places is not only currently revolutionizing the trade with analogous and digital prod-
ucts—it is transforming trade with labour as a commodity. As can be learned from 
classical monopoly capital theory, large corporations can maintain setting prices at 
high levels while still competing by cutting costs of production through automation 
and intensification of labour control. Again Amazon proves to be a significant exam-
ple for strategies applied in order to maximize profit by restructuring labour process-
es. 
4. Labour in Digital Monopolies 
Amazon’s radical market policy is complemented internally by systematically exploit-
ing its technological potential for enhancing the effectivity of the goods and services it 
offers. The main targets of new digital applications involve the expansion of digital 
forms of control over employees and increased use of potentials for automation that 
result from current developments in robotics. 
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4.1. Technology and Labour Control at Amazon 
Amazon is a leader in developing and implementing automation technologies. When 
Jeff Bezos staged a test flight of a delivery drone in late 2013 for the media and an-
nounced that a drone-based delivery system would be in place within five years, 
many observers held this for a publicity stunt that aimed mostly to signal to other de-
livery providers that Amazon could do without their services, so they would do well to 
keep their prices low. But when the company filed a patent for its own delivery drone, 
designed for use in the Amazon Prime Air program in April 2015, it became apparent 
that such announcements of an increasing automation of distribution were not just 
empty threats (Rose 2013; Zimmermann 2015). And there are signs elsewhere that 
plans exist to implement systematic automation into distribution. Amazon is merely 
one example of a trend that includes technologies such as self-driving cars and 
trucks slated to revolutionize the freight transport and distribution business. 
While it is yet undecided to what extent automation can be realized in these areas, 
warehouse and storage logistics offer examples to illustrate radical automation pro-
cesses. Industrial warehouses for products with little variation and fluctuation have 
already been highly automated for some time. But to date, existing automated sys-
tems have been unable to deal with the demands of booming Internet retailers, with 
their huge variety of products and high levels of fluctuation. Now, a shift in this area 
of low-level service work, which is particularly labour-intensive, seems to be in the 
offing. And again, Amazon is one of the pioneers. In 2012, Bezos acquired the robot-
ics company Kiva Systems (renamed Amazon Robotics in 2015), which specializes 
in automated material-handling systems for online retail business. Traditionally, there 
are two large labour-intensive areas in mail-order warehouses: order “pickers” collect 
the goods from various shelves, which “packers” then prepare and label for shipping. 
Kiva developed a technical system capable of substituting human pickers almost 
completely, based on a simple and ingenious idea. To render the pickers superflu-
ous, the goods are stored on portable storage units, a kind of robot vehicle, rather 
than fixed shelfs. When a particular product is needed, software guides the robot ve-
hicle to the appropriate storage unit, where it is retrieved and brought to the packing 
station. These automated robots navigate the huge warehouse with the help of bar 
codes on the floor and sensors that also prevent collisions. The vehicles also man-
age their own energy resources, heading for a power station as needed. Since Ama-
zon acquired Kiva Systems, little news has leaked out. Staff in the company’s sales 
department has been reduced considerably. Observers in this sector believe that 
Amazon has no interest in sharing the company’s technological and strategic exper-
tise with possible competitors and is developing a fully-automated system tailor-made 
to meet its own distribution needs. These speculations are fuelled by information that 
Amazon recently began taking steps to introduce new automation technology in its 
“fulfilment centres” (the company’s term for its warehouses) in the USA. In fall 2013, 
Jeff Bezos announced that pickers had been almost completed substituted by ma-
chines in three of Amazon’s main centres in the USA, and the company has reported 
that this step will double or treble the centres’ productivity (Fuchs 2013).  
However, neither delivery drones nor fully automated warehouses have been im-
plemented on a broader basis so far. While we can only speculate on the reasons for 
this instance—is the technology not ready yet? Is it not cost efficient facing cheap 
human labour?—one can be sure that leaking information about possibilities of au-
tomation always aims to put pressure on wages as human workers then supposedly 
compete with machines even when these technologies are not applied yet. 
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However, in its warehouses, Amazon has shown huge efforts in building a tight 
and efficient system of digital control focusing not so much on automation but on the 
extraction of value from human labour. A barcode system similar to the one that 
steers rolling shelves through Amazon’s warehouses aids its thousands of human 
employees in finding their way around the company’s warehouses. But the employ-
ees’ barcode scanners can do much more. They serve as a kind of time card for 
clocking working hours but also register incoming goods. And the scanners show 
pickers the shortest route through the warehouse, thus further contributing to greater 
employee efficiency. Union officials also report that the device is equipped with a mi-
crophone and camera for monitoring employees. In Germany, Amazon has con-
firmed the existence of this equipment but says it is not used, where it would violate 
existing data privacy laws—a statement strongly contested by union officials. 
 The scanner system means that Amazon can monitor not only the exact location 
of all goods stored but also track its employees’ activities—where they are, how 
many articles they handle in a given period of time, and how their performance com-
pares to that of their co-workers. In performance review meetings with employees, 
management can draw on the symbolic power of “objective” numbers provided by the 
digital control system in Amazon’s warehouses, which allows precise assessment of 
individual employees’ work. In the process of industrialization of service work, no 
fundamental distinction is made between managing products and managing human 
labour. Barcodes are merely the visible emblem of a digital control system that literal-
ly connects products and labour. Amazon’s fulfilment centres represent a kind of la-
boratory set-up for developments that are underway in diverse branches of the econ-
omy. Amazon’s digital control system is based on comprehensive monitoring of all 
data on the company’s employees deemed relevant for its operations. Today, intelli-
gent software on company computers as well as GPS data on the whereabouts of 
especially mobile employees or e-mail and voice communication from company cell 
phones supply a wealth of data that can be evaluated according to criteria that serve 
supervision and control strategies in a wide range of jobs and sectors—a process 
framed as “screening” in management literature. 
At Amazon, the opportunities of digital technology are also used to loosen and po-
tentially dissolve the long-term, predictable integration of workers within the compa-
ny. The less autonomous action is required of pickers and packers in the work pro-
cess, the easier they are to replace. Amazon takes advantage of the short period 
needed to train new employees (union officials speak of a training period of three to 
five hours for pickers and packers) to ensure that it can react flexibly to systematic 
fluctuation in demand. During busy periods such as before Christmas, Amazon in 
some cases employs more temporary employees than regular staff (Hegemann 
2014). These employees are not only object to digital control at work. In 2013 Ger-
man public service broadcasting ran a controversial documentary about the working 
and living conditions of Amazons temporary employees, many of them temporary 
migrants from other European countries. The documentary reported a tight system of 
exploitation of and control over these workers who were housed close to the ware-
houses in social isolation and whose every moves were, in the case of the Amazon 
complex in Bad Hersfeld, monitored by security guards connected to ultra-right wing 
neo-nazi groups who systematically violated workers’ privacy rights (Kwasniewski 
2013). While inside the warehouses, the company aims to control its labour force as 
directly as possible by digitizing organizational processes, in case of temporary em-
ployment, it seems to expand its control efforts to the private lives of workers. 
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The trend towards a digital transformation of immediate market access to labour is 
manifested in an even more radical form in Amazon tools such as Mechanical Turk 
and Amazon Home Services, two of the Amazon Web Services flagships. Mechani-
cal Turk is a pioneer crowdsourcing platform that businesses or individuals, called 
Requesters, can use to seek workers for paid tasks. For example, if a company 
wants a large number of photographs from its annual party to be labelled with amus-
ing titles for its company intranet, a so-called Provider or Turker can apply to do the 
task for a fixed price, usually a few cents per image. This crowdsourcing (Howe 
2006) model uses digital methods to shift discrete tasks from a company context to a 
mass of external, self-employed workers. In the crowdsourcing sector, Amazon is just 
one of many players. In 2014, about half a million people from 190 countries, in their 
majority from the USA and India, were using Mechanical Turk (Chandler and Paolac-
ci 2014, 184). Companies like Siemens, IBM, SAP, Bosch, or BMW run their own 
crowdsourcing platforms that list not only simple digital tasks for so-called “clickwork-
ers” but also jobs for qualified workers, for example in design or software develop-
ment (Boes et al. 2015). In the US, Amazon has also launched a digital platform for 
placement of non-digital workers, Amazon Home Services. Here, clients can pur-
chase the services of cleaners, handymen, landscapers, contractors, and others. And 
here again, Amazon is just one big fish in a pond with numerous other service pro-
viders, including a number of startups and large corporate players—Google for ex-
ample recruited a tech team from failed home service startup Homejoy in 2015 
spreading rumours of its own entry into the market. 
Taking these developments into account, the case of Amazon seems to challenge 
both Schumpeterian self-descriptions of the digital economy and theories of post cap-
italism. On one hand it seems like the dynamic and speed of companies’ develop-
ment is at least as much based on the exploitation of human labour as it is on entre-
preneurial initiative and innovation. On the other hand, the ever tighter grip of labour 
control, intensification and value extraction strongly challenges the assumptions of 
post capitalist theorists that capitalist labour is due to disappear as digitization pro-
gresses. Rather, it seems that we can understand current developments in digital 
capitalism through the perspective of monopoly capital theory: In order to stay in con-
trol over markets and hence retain the power of price setting, companies aim to form 
monopolies by enforcing rise and later closure of their socio-technical ecosystems. 
As an effect of this process, a situation of competition between large oligopolies aris-
es. In this situation, as classical monopoly capital theory teaches, labour control and 
labour process rationalization become essential to the goal of profit extraction. Like 
industrial monopoly capitalism of the 1960s and 70s, digital monopoly capitalism de-
velops new applications of technology in order to raise productivity of labour. 
4.2. Digital Taylorism and Contingency Work 
In order to use our findings drawn mostly from the Amazon case study for a more compara-
tive approach to other digital economy companies, it seems useful to summarize them in 
more generalizing theoretical terms. We find that Amazon can teach us two lessons in par-
ticular about the development of labour in digital capitalism: A new form of digital control, 
which we call digital Taylorism, and the creation of a new type of labour force as the object of 
a process of social disembedding (Polanyi 2001) through digital technology. In order to ad-
dress these phenomena in a way that shows how they represent changes to previous states 
of labour control and labour force social integration, we will describe them with regard to their 
historical predecessors. 
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4.2.1. Digital Taylorism 
As we have shown, in Amazon warehouses, a new form of digital Taylorism has 
emerged that increasingly transfers modes of organizing and rationalizing work from 
the industrial sector to the service sector. From the perspective of entrepreneurs, 
Taylorizing industrial work, which began in the early twentieth century, involved two 
key promises. First, “scientific management” (a term that Frederick Taylor adopted in 
1911) of industrial work processes was supposed to lead to enormous increases in 
productivity. Second, the mechanization of manufacturing came with the promise of a 
system of comprehensive control over human work. Workers on the assembly line 
could neither determine autonomously the speed at which they worked, nor did a 
work process rationalized according to Taylorist principles offer opportunities for 
workers to structure workflow as they wished, much less to determine the content of 
work independently. In essence, this was a system for regulating human work 
through machines. But as more and more steps in production were automated in the 
twentieth century, the impacts changed the character of industrial work. Increasingly 
complex knowledge about the functioning of individual machines as well as compre-
hensive production systems shaped employees’ tasks and meant that they could be-
come machine operators rather than mere appendixes of machines. As industrial 
work gained in status, organizational principles that had previously been the domain 
of white-collar work entered the industrial sector. Project and group work modes were 
established, leading to the end of Taylorism, at least in some segments of industry. 
In service factories like Amazon, comprehensive control and regulation of humans 
by machines are returning to the world of work. Today, apps and algorithms have 
assumed the role of the assembly line. On the one hand, such technologies allow 
employers to comprehensively monitor their staff, by constantly determining and 
evaluating their location and work performance. On the other hand, they not only 
serve as orientation aids for employees; they also directly manage them as they 
complete tasks. The monitor at a packing station shows what order has to be han-
dled and how; the hand scanner determines the route a worker has to take through 
the warehouse; the app on the crowdsourcing platform guides workers to the next 
steps in a particular job.  
Classic models of control at the workplace that address service jobs point to bu-
reaucratic schemes in the form of “strategies of social rationalization” that rely on 
personal control to be implemented (Staab 2014, 341–351). Bureaucratic regulation 
of the work process is based on dictating the standardization of tasks. However, such 
rationalization strategies always depend on personalized, direct relationships, within 
which implementation of the rules is monitored. Empirical evidence shows that hybrid 
forms that combine technical and social rationalization strategies can currently be 
observed in many fields of work. In mail and parcel delivery services, for example, 
GPS devices are increasingly being used to allow management to determine the 
whereabouts of delivery staff at all times. Whether such data is actually used to con-
trol employees depends on whether someone decides to check available information 
on a particular deliverer. But potential developments in digitization indicate that tech-
nical solutions are likely to utilize algorithms to monitor performance automatically. In 
Amazon’s service factories, algorithms for guiding assessment have tended to render 
personalized evaluations unnecessary since workers’ autonomous activities are al-
ready so limited that monitoring by management has become superfluous. Wherever 
digital Taylorism has taken hold, people are again becoming appendixes of machines 
in certain areas of the world of work. 
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4.2.2. The Contingent Work Force 
As outlined above, expanding forms of digital control apply not only to employees 
who are responsible for tasks in core areas of the work process that are essential for 
its smooth functioning. Digitization also offers completely new opportunities for hybrid 
employment systems within a company. Increasingly, workers are only loosely linked 
to a company’s periphery, from where they can be integrated into the work flow of the 
core workforce via crowdsourcing models as the need arises, with less and less effort 
and cost. From the perspective of the sociology of organizations, the differences in 
working conditions for clickworkers and seasonal employees in Amazon’s fulfilment 
centres are merely gradual. Just like clickworkers, Amazon’s seasonal staff represent 
a systematic transformation of how work is organized that has become possible in 
digital capitalism. 
Under Fordism, a company plant as an organization was not only a site of control; 
it also offered a certain level of protection from the risks of the marketplace. By virtue 
of membership in the organization—that is, by being on the staff of a particular com-
pany site—employees were generally entailed to the guaranteed benefits of social 
security systems, collective labour agreements, and labour law standards. Many 
companies “protect” their employees despite cyclical fluctuation in demand, by ab-
staining, for example, from lay-offs during such periods either because they are 
obliged to do so because of collective-bargaining agreements or because it serves 
their own planning interests. Under post-Fordist conditions, the situation changed. 
Since the 1990s, at the latest, more and more companies aim to implement consid-
erably more flexible forms of organizing work. Cutbacks in social security systems 
and less binding collective-bargaining agreements now offer business new opportuni-
ties for deregulating jobs, allowing more leeway for adapting personnel policies in 
response to changes on the market. The growing risks associated with volatile mar-
kets have been passed on to employees—a situation that, roughly since the 1990s, 
has created a vital debate on new forms of precariousness of labour (Castel 2002).  
Nonetheless, membership in the respective organization still played a role in such 
models to the extent that management’s market rhetoric was chiefly related to em-
ployees who belonged to core staff and thus continued to profit from the “remain-
ing”—but still considerable—advantages of standards set by collective agreements 
and applicable labour law. 
In digital capitalism, the company as an organization—that is, as a general medi-
um of social and institutional inclusion—is systematically scaled down. The remaining 
core staff is complemented with a varying number of “free” workers who no longer 
enjoy the promise of participation that was linked to belonging to the organization, 
both in the Fordist and Post-Fordist periods. At first glance, this may appear to be a 
contradiction, since, as was outlined above, the revolution of markets under digital 
capitalism targets in particular the systematic incorporation of new market segments, 
potential competitors, or promising new branches. Closer inspection shows, however, 
that companies’ organizational strategies involve a combination of closed centres 
and peripheries that are opened to a certain extent (Dolata 2015, 519). In digital capi-
talism, the formal borders of companies are increasingly tightened, as more and 
more employees are no longer needed. A satellite system of labour peripheries 
emerges around the centres. Workers outside the core staff are integrated into the 
company’s production model only temporarily and partially, while they remain perma-
nently excluded from formal membership in the organization. 
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The same concept of interaction between compact centres and flexible peripheries 
is also revealed in organizational strategies for managing labour as a commodity. On 
the one side there is a stable core of indispensable, highly-qualified employees; on 
the other, there is a frequently much larger group of peripheral workers for simple 
tasks in semi-Taylorized work processes. For the latter, neither Fordism’s organiza-
tional promise of protection, nor the “thumbscrews”—mostly mental—of Post-Fordism 
can be drawn on as resources (Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014).  
As labour becomes redundant, a new type of worker seems to emerge. Karl Marx 
characterized nineteenth century proletarians as free in two respects: as a free legal 
subject and as free from any ownership of the means of production; the latter was the 
reason that he or she was ultimately forced to sell his or her labour as a commodity. 
In twenty-first century capitalism, free labour is again transformed. In digital capital-
ism, labour is made available on demand; as a result, a contingent digital workforce 
(Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994) emerges. For 
these (formally) independent contractors, their status as contingent workers is not 
protected from competition on the labour market by an employer’s contractual guar-
antees. Companies no longer need to buy employees’ compliance by assuming mar-
ket risks for them, as they do for permanent staff members. Those who offer their 
labour and are not associated with an institution face contingency in two respects: 
they depend systematically on the congruence of demand (tasks, assignments) and 
supply (availability of their labour at the conditions offered) but lack effective influ-
ence on the price of their own labour, which depends chiefly on the size and compo-
sition of the digital reserve army. The fact that this labour reservoir is growing and 
increasingly less subject to spatial constraints opens the floodgates for price dumping 
on the labour market. One could argue that this organizational disintegration only 
reflects a general process of precarization of work (Castel 2002) that has been going 
on for a while now. While we agree that contingent digital work is indeed precarious 
concerning labour contracts and social security, we also see a new aspect to contin-
gent digital labour: Discipline is effectively secured, as described above, not only 
through fears of growing competition but also with the use of increasingly sophisti-
cated digital control methods. In this respect, digital contingent work differs systemat-
ically from what is associated with the precarious labour of post-Fordist capitalism. 
While the post-Fordist precariat is either self-employed and free of direct control or 
temporarily integrated into a company and thus in its social system (of course to a 
lesser extent than core staff members), digital contingent labour is both “free” from 
social integration into the corporate universe and integrated tightly into a company’s’ 
system of control. Increasingly automated direct control has returned, albeit without 
the benefits that membership in an organization offers employees in classic job 
forms. All of this is embedded in a context of highly asymmetric constellations of 
power and access to information. For example, clickworkers often do not even know 
who has commissioned the tasks they are performing (Strube 2015). The platform 
that passes on the tasks also serves as an isolating layer that prevents contacts be-
tween companies and workers. Industrial capitalism’s patrimonial model of care and 
discipline is thus substituted by a supply-driven gatekeeper model from the politics of 
organizations. Unauthorized persons have no access. 
5. No End to Capitalism 
The empirical elaborations and tentative theoretical assumptions in this article aimed 
at challenging theories of post capitalism, which, in the context of this text, have been 
associated with current works of Jeremy Rifkin and Paul Mason. In their latest books, 
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both authors argue for a more or less inevitable end to capitalism. They assume that 
private accumulation is systematically blocked by the inability of capitalist corpora-
tions to create revenues by setting prices as they lose control over the reproduction 
of their commodities in an economy where people have the power to make most 
things in non-capitalist production models themselves. Mason states, however, that, 
in building dominant monopolies, leading digital economy companies could retain the 
power of price setting while the products they deal with become increasingly cheaper 
in terms of production costs. Notwithstanding, he argues that these attempts will be 
failing in the end as such monopolies cannot stop the rise of open source and peer 
production. In order to challenge these ideas, we asked two questions, applied em-
pirically mostly on the case of Amazon: Is the digital economy really moving towards 
a state in which corporations lose all control over markets, which then become in-
creasingly decommodified? And second, is there really any end to capitalist labour or 
at least a reduction in capitalist modes of exploitation connected to the digitization 
trend? 
While we cannot give a definite answer to both questions, close analysis of Ama-
zon and thoughts on the policies of other leading digital corporations bring us to con-
clusions which challenge the assumptions of post capitalist theories. First, key corpo-
rate players of digitization—in particular Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple and Fa-
cebook—are indeed trying to become powerful monopolies and have partly succeed-
ed in doing so, using network effects of digital platforms, the power of scaling routed 
in the zero marginal cost logic of digital goods and building socio-technical ecosys-
tems in order to enforce customer retention. Second, it seems that leading digital 
economy companies tend to develop in part isomorphic structures on the supply side, 
hence creating a situation of oligopolistic market competition. We drew on basic as-
sumptions of monopoly capital theory, which were elaborated empirically in 1960s to 
1980s industrial sociology, to explain that in this situation of oligopolistic competition, 
cost cutting, achieved primarily via labour process rationalization, becomes key to the 
corporation’s competitive strategies. In our view, the case study of Amazon and our 
theoretical assumptions drawn from it offer evidence that strategies of cost cutting 
especially target the enhancement of digital labour control. Our conclusion is, there-
fore, that theorists like Mason might be right (although not for the right reasons) in 
arguing that large digital corporations fail in building stable monopolies. This, howev-
er, does not seem to imply any end to capitalist labour. Rather it seems to call for a 
tightening of the grip of labour control and new modes of exploitation of human la-
bour—phenomena we have addressed with the terms digital Taylorism and digital 
contingent work. In our view, the current state of digital capitalism resembles a fight 
for supremacy between large digital corporations, which is based on the enforcement 
of extraction of value from human labour. Our assumption therefore is that we see 
nothing like the end of capitalism in the digital economy. Rather, capitalism is matur-
ing in the usage of digital technologies following tracks well known from the history 
industrial societies. 
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